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Introduction
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2008
In his presidential address to the 2005 annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association, Troy Duster argues (2006:1) that “the increasing authority of reductionist
science” presents one of the main challenges to current sociological research. According to
him, this surge of reductionism is fueled first and foremost by those sciences that explain
nearly everything from “inside the bodies,” e. g. through brain scans or DNA analysis
(M’charek, this issue). Th us, reductionism is a drive external to sociology, one which
challenges sociological work on at least two levels: First, research funding is diverted away
from sociology toward the search for mostly neurological, genetic, or biological “causes
of wide ranging problems – from disparities in health and educational achievement to
explanations of alcoholism and violence” (Duster 2006). Second, sociology is challenged
to move beyond mere constructivist commentary and to regain confidence and relevance
by engaging in investigations of those very architectures of knowledge production, which
Duster makes out to be at the heart of this emerging constellation of reductionism.
These architectures are those of the natural sciences, medicine and psychology, and of
state agencies and business: they are inscribed in bio-banks, health insurance databases,
clinical trials, drug approval procedures, public health policies etc. They are not the
architectures of the social sciences proper.
However, Duster does not attempt a reflexive turn to include sociology itself in his
analysis. Had he done so, he could have pointed out that a very similar development
is unfolding within the social sciences themselves. An increasing amount of work in
the social sciences is focused on representing economies, nation states, or regions in
scales, rates, ranks, and intervals. Quantitative research feeds into global evaluation
and benchmarking. Performances in education, schooling, or medical care are measured,
compared, and rated. National and international bodies alike increase their funding of
large-scale, cross-national survey work in line with global demands and requirements of
transparency, cooperation and learning (see also Scheffer, this issue).
Thus we extend Duster’s analysis: in the same way that science funding generally is
becoming skewed towards reductionism, funding within the social sciences is prioritized
into large-scale, cross-national project clusters. Certain forms of comparison thrive in these
constellations, as cross-national survey design and statistical analysis render comparison
seemingly unproblematic in principle. Other forms, however, such as qualitative and
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ethnographic comparison, are not readily compatible with these practices of knowledge
production.
It is surprising, then, that the involvement of the qualitative social sciences in com-
parative analyses has nevertheless been on the increase. They are not just bystanders
impressed by the output of their quantitative colleagues. Qualitative scholars get them-
selves involved in cross-national comparative projects, albeit with widespread ambivalence
on the part of their own research communities. The current situation, then, is one of
ambivalence: On the one hand, the standard mode of comparison has been criticised
as mechanistic, technical, and naïve (vis-à-vis hegemonic concepts and categories), es-
pecially by those of ethnographic provenance (cf. Marcus 1982). On the other hand,
the rising demand for cross-cultural and comparative research has proved productive for
ethnographers (as cultural translators).
Being pushed to producing objects of comparison has motivated scholars to question and
redefine their established fields of observation (Moore 2005). It provides some expedient
rationales to generate, to sharpen and to qualify ethnographic concepts, methodology,
and praxeological theory. It raises awareness, moreover, about how best to produce
comparability in ethnographic sociological research.
This “epistemic slippage” between a well-rehearsed critique of comparison as a formal
method, on the one hand, and the challenges and benefits of actual comparative research
practice, on the other, forms the starting point for the contributions to this special
issue. We argue for a new, confident, yet partially tentative and reflexive stance towards
comparison in ethnographic research. Comparison should not be left exclusively to certain
social scientific research traditions and methods. Comparison also should not simply be
either criticised or neglected. At the same time, comparison should not be undertaken
simply by copying the deductive model of quantitative approaches.
Comparison should be seen as a challenge, one exceeding both the single case study
and the contrasting of any number of multiple cases. Comparison, we believe, enriches
ethnography and adds to its aspiration for thick description.
Some scholars, therefore, have begun to sketch an alternative to quantitative comparison.
According to Fox and Gingrich (2002) comparison requires a plurality of methods; for
Barro, Jordan and Roberts (1998) it should be thick, explorative and multi-dimensional;
for others it should resemble an ongoing dialogue between cultures (as Geertz envisioned
in 1986) and it should strive to “make discoveries” rather than insisting on consciously
seeking comparative results (Yengoyan 2006).
This special issue calls for an additional twist: ethnographic comparison should focus on
and explicate the production of comparability. This, in turn, leads inexorably to explicit
discussions of the limits of qualitative comparability. Thus, the thickness of qualitative
comparison derives from: its augmentation of quantitative differences and similarities, its
processual and explorative character, and its demonstrations of the conditions and the
limits of qualitative comparability.1
1The explorative use of comparison goes back to Mills, who achieves a measure of “sociological imagina-
tion” by ways of comparison: “On almost any problem with which I am concerned, I try to get a
comparative grip on the materials.” This grip is playful and analytical. And it produces comparability
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In compiling this special issue, we do not claim that thick comparison is entirely
new, or that Sociology and Anthropology have failed to discuss the traps and limits of
comparison (see Matthes 1992). The opposite is the case. We simply realise the necessity
to change the status of methodical critique and sensitivity in this area. In other words,
the impossibility to compare objects in their totality or thickness (or to translate from
one entire context to another) should not stifle productive comparative research. It
should rather instigate “problematic comparison”: we are able to learn from the problems
(of comparing) and the resistances (to being compared), and not only from clear-cut
solutions.
Thus, we can be read as calling for “risking thick comparison.”2 Failing is one productive
constituent of this mode of comparison.3
Scepticism and Beyond
We are interested neither in providing a new grand theory of qualitative comparative
method nor in wishing to ignore important critical achievements by simply “going for
it.” We appreciate the long and varied trajectory the idea of comparative analysis and
enquiry has had over the past two centuries in the social sciences (Yengoyan 2006).
However, we do recognise that most qualitative and, indeed, ethnographic researchers
today, no matter whether their background is in sociology, anthropology, political science
or ethnology, shy away from the challenges of comparing complex practices. The reasons
for this are multifaceted: Those employing microscopic methods and steeped in intricacies
of a particular field emphasise the importance and uniqueness of their local settings.
They thereby resist attempts to isolate objects of knowledge which may be able to travel
across contexts (Star and Griesemer 1989; Strathern 2006). The duration of participant
observation and the diverse types of collected data go along with calls for the uniqueness
and incomparability of each field. These claims, along with narrative strategies, contribute
centrally to ethnographic authority (Clifford 1988).
Those interested in theory-driven analyses point out that analytical concepts are bound
strongly to their “native” context, and thus necessarily fail to capture meaning adequately
in comparative settings. These scholars relate to the contextual nature of language games
and the “impossibility of translation” (Lyotard 1988).4
Those concerned with power relations in asymmetrical relationships criticise comparison
for reinforcing existing hegemonies, thus reproducing and stabilising highly problematic
patterns of dominance and dependency (Collier 1997; Nguyen 2005).
after the first imagination: “[A]nd I can then sort out the dimensions in terms of which the comparisons
are made.” (1959: 215).
2Or, as Tagore points out (2006: 79) “in the face of the sceptical attack”, meaning in his case the
“impossibility of translation:” “It is the sense of possibility that I invoke in my remarks.”
3A similar attitude can be witnessed in discussions of field access. Some ethnographers (e.g. Whyte
1943) turned a failure to obtain access into a success in relation to certain research questions. They
declared field access as limited by principle.
4For an overview, see Aoki (1992) on anthropological fieldwork, or Howland (2003) for cultural histori-
ography.
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Another challenge arises from within occupational disciplines themselves. Comparison
is omnipresent in everyday social practices: in the work of lawyers, medical practitioners,
or engineers. There is no single occupational activity that is not in some sense using
comparison in order to forge relations and produce order and meaning. While this
omnipresence of comparison may also encourage its use amongst observing social scientists,
the mixing of “reflexive observing science” and “participant common sense” troubles those
who favour sharp distinctions. Comparing too rapidly can turn into a somehow “too
common” and “too involved” everyday undertaking, lacking the rigour and systematics
expected from social scientific method. Comparison seems a mundane exercise of the
tinkerer and blender.
Last but not least, comparison as a method is not developed primarily by ethnographic
disciplines. Like statistics, comparison seems to be owned by other methodologies and
methods – those of Western law, economics, experimental psychology, or functionalist
macro-sociology. It seems to be placed outside the scope of ethnography and its intrinsic
tendency to place elements in complex cultural, organisational, or practical relations – as
opposed to seeking monolithic lines of cause and effect. Ethnography as a critical project
distances itself from constructions that tend to subsume everything specific under general
categories or institutions, such as law, labour, or variables. Ethnography rather protects
life worlds against the levelling of all differences, the measuring of the immeasurable, or
the translation of idiosyncrasies into versions of the same.
Distancing, however, does not necessarily rule out any involvement with alternative
modes of social scientific comparison. It simply does not make sense to ban comparison
in toto. British anthropologist Marilyn Strathern summarises this stance very well when
she argues (2002:xvi): “Comparison is fundamental to the critical moment. [. . . ] Each
enactment of comparison [. . . ] falls short of, is often less than, the intellectual promise
of comparison itself. Now, if we consider that ‘falling-short’ relationally, if we put it
alongside other shortfalls, it begins to look interesting.” The reflexive moment, which is
advocated here for analytical purposes regarding the objects, frames and explications of
ethnographies, is central to the papers in this issue.
Modes of Comparison
The attempt to develop what one might call thick comparison is not new. The opposite
is true: from its early beginnings, ethnography has been a comparative enterprise that
contrasted foreign culture with home culture, the other with the familiar, the exotic
with the common. This difference “helped to make discoveries through different ways of
seeing things – by drawing forth new, unique and possibly odd implications that bear
on what is being compared” (Yengoyan 2006:4). However, whenever comparison was
turned into an explicit, conscious and systematic method, it was subjected to harsh
critique, which often led to paradigmatic debates.5 Throughout the history of sociology
5One classic debate absorbed legal anthropology in the 1960s and 1970s, the main adversaries being
Bohannan (1969) and Gluckman (1969). At the heart of their conflict was the tertium comparationis.
Was it allowed to relate to “English” concepts, as Gluckman did by referring to English Jurisprudence?
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and social anthropology, qualitative and particularly ethnographic comparison has thus
been viewed with a good deal of suspicion. The social anthropologist Evans-Pritchard
famously commented in 1963: “There is only one method in social anthropology, the
comparative method – and that is impossible.” This epitomises the ambivalent relationship
anthropology has always had with comparison, as productive and reductive at the same
time.
In sociology, ethnographic comparison has been central to the early development of
the discipline. Tocqueville, Martineau, Comte, Marx, Weber, Durkheim,6 and others
employed cross-country and cross-cultural comparison as the basis for explanatory and/or
interpretative analyses of social processes and societal organisation. At the heart of these
modernist comparisons were evolutionary concepts that placed cultures or societies at
certain stages in a continuum. The state under investigation, for instance, would lack
this or that component of the “modern state.”
However, throughout the 20th century, different modes of comparison have been
developed by scholars in Marxism, structuralism (Lévi-Strauss), structural functionalism
(Durkheim, Parsons), systems theory (Luhmann), or structuration theory (Giddens). In
ethnography, some qualitative modes of comparison have become particularly prominent,
namely symbolic interactionism (Blumer, Goffman), processual and figurative sociology
(Elias), grounded theory (Glaser, Spradley), and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, Lynch).
However, ethnographic comparison of cultures or cultural practices either remained
entangled in debates over colonialism, orientalism, writing culture, or reflexivity, or it
quietly withdrew to the regional and disciplinary “comfort zones” of like-minded scholars
(Strathern 2002). Comparison became an exercise within ethnographic fields rather
than across fields.7 This is why the established statistical approach to cross-national
or crosscultural comparison lacks an ethnographic counterpart of similar disciplinary
standing.
Is it possible to mobilise the theoretical potentials inhering in sociological ethnographies
in particular in their numerous studies of regions, professions, workplaces, organisational
cultures, political movements, institutional careers, socio-material networks, youth gangs,
legal processes, etc.?8 These contextsensitive, relational, explorative and reflexive studies
seem promising when it comes to the task of actually producing (limited) comparability.
They invite a mode of thick comparison that will in some cases enrich and in other
cases develop alternative understandings of the subject matter both outside and inside
comparative projects.
Or should the foreign culture be analysed and understood within its own terms, as Bohannan insisted
by leaving concepts in the “original”?
6Comparison was at the core of these grand theories: “We have only one way of demonstrating that one
phenomenon is the cause of another. This is to compare the cases where they are both simultaneously
present or absent (. . . )” (Durkheim 1982: 147). For Durkheim, comparison is at the heart of
“sociological proof.”
7Hammersby and Atkinson understand the comparative method as the “one general method for testing
causal relations” (1983: 200). It is used to enhance models and typologies for the field under study
and to generate and test hypotheses relating to these maps.
8According to Matthes (1992: 78), it is these middle range theories that are best equipped to carry out
comparison. The level of abstraction should lie between universalism and localism.
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Enacting Objects of Comparison
One of the challenges, and here we return to Duster, is to develop ways of engaging the
different architectures of comparative knowledge production with each other, in order to
produce findings for others to “invent around,” findings that are generative and make new
connections. Marilyn Strathern rightly argues that mechanistic comparisons have often
been taken to the stage where they only produce knowledge like itself (Strathern 2002).
Put in ethnographic wording, these sorts of comparisons are “going native,” sharing the
criteria and problematisations of the regulative field under study (such as unemployment,
crime, or illness). Yet the response to this development is neither a celebration of the
local and idiosyncratic nor a search for explanatory models with the least unexplained
variance. Rather, the response is to cast our attention to the multiple ways of producing
objects of knowledge and how ethnographic comparison contributes to this endeavour
alongside other approaches.
This forms the leading question for the articles in this issue: how does thick comparison
engage with its field and sites to produce comparability, and, as a core part of this,
produce objects of comparison? The identified and invented comparative objects will be
presented primarily in their performative force, meaning in the ways they make new links
and relations and explicate novel qualities and dynamics (both within the ethnographic
field and in ethnographers’ social scientific discipline). This means that the objects of
comparison are presented in more or less the same ways they were created during the
research phase.
Some papers here present this process as a journey from one site to another (Sørensen),
others as juxtaposition by accident (M’charek), and still others as an inbuilt contrast
in the field of practice (Langstrup & Winthereik) or as a theoretical or methodological
stimulus (Scheffer or Schmidt, respectively). All these studies, as a result, are driven
by solicited dialogues between empirical and theoretical perspectives. This dialogical
character places thick comparison at the forefront of empirical research and theorising:
a rhythmical interchange between observations, theoretical sources, and concepts of
explication.
Ethnographic comparison is analytical ethnography in a radical sense. The dialogue
between various ethnographic fields is aided by a formal and analytical attitude, similar to
conflict parties engaging a third party in order to keep in touch. Creating comparability
is a productive challenge. It initiates, enriches, and thickens ethnographic explication
similar to metaphors, theories, or concepts (Hirschauer & Amann 1997). The drive
towards comparability confronts ethnographic research with demands of explication,
with a play of distance and closeness, with the alteration of perspectives and levels (see
Clifford 1988), and – as a result – with a “comparative optics.”9 Thick comparison exposes
itself to these alternations in seeking shared grounds and homelands, comparability and
incomparable states.
9Knorr (1999: 4) explains this optics as follows: “Using a comparative optics as a framework for seeing,
one may look at one science through the lens of the other. This ‘visibilizes’ the invisible; each pattern
detailed in one science serves as a sensor for identifying and mapping (equivalent, analog, conflicting)
patterns in the other.”
6
The objects of comparison are not representations of what one would find and bring
back home from the field. They are not representatives of cultures or measures of cultural
performance. They are rather articulations of analogous properties or problematics –
related to a whole range of motions, and effects. How do these analogous features take
place (differently)? How are the features different? In a strict sense, the objects of
comparison are not found by our studies (Schmidt, this issue), but “enacted” (Urry &
Law 2006). They are performative in the way they connect what would otherwise remain
unconnected, specify what would otherwise remain unspecified, and emphasize what
would otherwise remain unrecognised.
Thick Comparison in this Issue
The contributions to this special topics issue all rely on ethnographic comparative
work. They do not, however, simply report on results from this work. Rather, they
portray biographies of comparables, i. e. objects that emerged from and organised thick
comparison. In this way, the reader becomes a witness of comparative work: watching
objects being produced, defined, traced, employed and dismissed.
Important here is the efficacy of the constructed object of study with respect to the
results its yields, the object’s ability to be invented around, to forge new relations and to
open up new perspectives. In this sense, the constructed object is more mediator and
catalyst than entity. Such objects thus readily crisscross data types and sources. They
work differently at different stages of research. By parading our constructed objects
of comparison, we wish to jump right into the empirical and conceptual practice of
research. We wish to celebrate the limits of comparison as hypotheses-generating points
of departure (Scheffer, this issue).
The papers in this issue introduce the reader to different stages of thick comparison.
Some papers emphasise the choice of sites (Sørensen) and the researcher’s efforts to
move them into juxtaposition (Schmidt); others emphasise how this juxtaposition lays
bare some unexpected comparables (Langstrup & Winthereik); still others spell out
the limited grounds of comparability (Scheffer) and its alternatives that overcome the
enactment of separate units (M’charek). All of the papers nonetheless share one core
idea: the comparable state remains incomplete and yet it enriches the ethnographic
study empirically and analytically by helping to spell out this incompleteness. That
is, a movement towards the margins of comparability unites the papers in this issue
irrespective of their different objects of study: criminal procedures (Scheffer), asthma
treatment (Langstrup & Winthereik), computer programming (Schmidt), regulation of
under age media use (Sørensen), and forensics (M’charek).
In overview, the papers present the following versions of thick comparison:
Scheffer argues in his analysis of binding effects in criminal procedures in the US,
England and Germany that these effects, which emerge between different versions of the
same objects in past and present, cannot be captured with the static objects of comparative
law-in-the-books. Rather, it is an understanding of objects (such as statements or cases)
as interactive becomings, unfolding in events and processes of law-in-action, which renders
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a high degree of incomparability of procedures across countries. This is a productive
finding of thick comparison.
In Sørensen’s paper on the regulation of children’s computer games in Germany and
Denmark, the starting point is the surprising incomparability of seemingly similar sites
of regulation. Through a multi-sited study, Sørensen is able to appreciate this difference
and deliver as a result multiple objects of comparison which reveal their own ability to
fuel comparing as an analytical challenge. Absent this challenge, some sites of this study
would never have been brought together and, more important, fundamentals of doing
regulation would pass unrecognised.
Schmidt’s sites also seem entirely incompatible. Comparing boxing and programming is
by no means an obvious study design. Yet a closer look reveals that using a comparative
optics in analysing ethnographic data, this design makes visible what we did not expect
to see: the embodied nature of programming and the “mental” aspects of boxing. Here
the issue is not so much the adequacy of the object of comparison which takes centre
stage – boxing is not like programming, however much we compare the two – but the
study design’s explorative ability to make incomparability productive.
As in comparative law, so, too, Langstrup and Winthereik find that their field of study
is already engaged in comparison. A pharmaceutical company compares an online asthma
self-assessment tool in a clinical trial with the same tool in general practice, to find that
the tool works only in the trial setting. From the company’s perspective, this is a case of
“split reality,” where the tool fails to account for everyday applications in medical practice.
The thick comparison of the paper produces comparability between experimental setting
and clinical setting by taking into account the differences in practices and in patient
identities between these settings.
M’charek’s study on current and future forensic techniques – fingerprinting, DNA
fingerprinting and DNA-based reconstruction of phenotypic features – focuses on the
political and epistemological dimensions of identifying crime suspects. While the tech-
nologies themselves may be portrayed either as vastly different or as variants of the same,
depending on one’s point of view, the paper builds a thick comparison to show the mani-
fold connections between the technologies, the political discourse and the bio-scientific
practices. In this analysis, comparing and contrasting become intertwined.
These papers provide an insight into different ways to enact objects of comparison at
different stages throughout the process of comparison. In all cases, thick comparison
contributes to a respecification of the studied settings, practices, and regimes. We hope
that this special issue will serve as an invitation to thick comparison as:
• it revitalises the articulation work inherent in analytical ethnographies;
• it varies observer perspectives and points towards “blind spots”;
• it names and creates “new things” and modes of empirical work;
• it gives way to intensified dialogues between data analysis and theorizing.
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